Read an excerpt from my book, “Montgomery vs. Rommel at El Agheila 1942,” describing the political rivalry between Mussolini and Hitler that resulted in Rommel’s assignment to Africa. Order the book here!

The Italian Army had been roundly defeated and humiliated after Italy’s fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, in a fit of envy, had attempted to out-Blitzkrieg his German allies by marching into British-controlled Egypt. Although theoretically independent, neutral and led by its own king, Egypt was subject to de facto occupation by British troops guarding the Suez Canal …

Mussolini happened to be next door in Libya and decided he was going to upset the Egyptian apple cart for no other reason than just because he could. He presumed too much, however. On 13 September 1940, a total of 80,000 proud Italian soldiers had cruised over the border across Egypt’s Western Desert in parade formation for about 60 miles before being thrown out on their ear shortly afterwards, leaving the British threatening Italian Libya. Mussolini’s invasion seemed to be going in reverse…

Marshal Rodolfo Graziani was supposed to be fending the British off, but had become frightened after a previous assassination attempt in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where he was despised by the local population for his acts of cruelty. Having once fallen unceremoniously through a hole in the floor of a church, which he was convinced had been a deliberate trap, and more recently missed by a shower of grenades thrown at him by assassins in February 1937 which left him with over 300 shrapnel wounds, Graziani had retreated for his own safety into a four-room villa in Cyrene, Libya which contained a cellar leading down to an ancient Ptolemaic tomb about 30m underground. From there he supposedly commanded Italian troops. This unusual choice for headquarters was to become a bone of contention between Graziani and the belligerent Duce, who was frustrated by Graziani’s indecision as well as his cowardice.

Mussolini hoped that Graziani, who had enjoyed a fearsome reputation thanks to his vicious acts against the Ethiopian population, would make an ideal candidate to lead a triumphant Italian sweep into Egypt. In a letter on 19 August 1940, the Duce wrote to his chosen warrior that he was supposed to charge into Egypt as a parallel performance to the planned Nazi invasion of Great Britain.

“So, on the day when the first platoon of German soldiers touches English soil, you will simultaneously attack,” reasoned Mussolini, although he later changed his mind about whether it mattered that the Germans had even invaded England or not. The important thing to Mussolini was getting prestige.

Yet Graziani balked at the idea of squaring off against the British Army. The Duce observed the destined hero of Italy withering in the face of danger and attempted to ease his worries with the words: “Graziani … I have never imposed a territorial objective. All I want you to do is to attack!”

Graziani proved petrified with indecision. This was an unexpected reaction from the Marshal of Italy who had been so defensive of his masculinity in the wake of his 1937 shrapnel wounds that he had himself photographed stark naked by a professional cameraman to prove his manhood to Mussolini – a bizarre gesture which was even too much for Mussolini himself, and to which the Duce did not respond…

The reluctant Marshal did attack, clumsily and without any strategic vision. He fumed in his diary, showering everyone he could think of with scathing names and inventing a conspiracy theory that his political rivals in Rome had set him up to fail. The majority of his troops were either non-motorized or poorly motorized, meaning that many soldiers lacked functioning wheels to get away quickly after the short-lived spurt of their advance was inevitably turned helter-skelter in the other direction…

In September 1940, the Italian fascist government had produced a propaganda poster showing the spirit of the ancient Roman conqueror Scipio Africanus wrapped in a flowing cape and marching triumphantly beside a mounted Graziani. Yet Graziani would do no marching, not even enough to have allowed a ghostly Scipio’s cape to flutter behind him in retreat. Much to Mussolini’s outrage, Graziani remained the commander of the catacombs, relaying orders sporadically while refusing to budge. That Graziani was cowering was bad enough, but the fact that his chosen refuge was an ancient tomb made the Duce even more incandescent with humiliation…

Despite these travails, Mussolini remained determined to launch another invasion – of Greece this time. … Envious of Hitler, the Duce was trying hard to flex his military muscles. Unfortunately for Mussolini, his military turned out to be in weaker shape than he had imagined. The attack on Greece did not go well, as the Italians quickly discovered there the same ferocious defiance that in ancient times had kept the Peloponnesian War going for 27 years and made legends of the Spartans. Another disaster was in the making, and it did nothing to improve Italy’s situation in North Africa… After the spectacular fall of Bardia on 5 January 1941, Mussolini was persuaded by Ciano to request a meeting with Hitler with the ulterior motive of sponging some military aid off the Nazis …

Mussolini’s public position was like that of a man who had attempted to show off by making a high dive into a swimming pool only to be seen floundering and sinking in the deep end. After he got over the initial paralysis of embarrassment he allowed himself to be fussed by Ciano into making an approach for help to his fellow despot.

The two dictators met at Hitler’s Berghof residence in the Bavarian Alps near Berchtesgaden on 19 and 20 January 1941. Hitler impressed the Italian delegation with a show of loyalty and interest in Italian affairs. Amid the cold splendor of the mountain peaks, Hitler promised to send a German Panzer unit to Libya….

Privately Hitler and members of his inner circle, particularly Goebbels, were acutely aware of a publicity problem. German propaganda had made much of their Axis alliance with Italy. …Lending each other public support in their political ambitions, Hitler and Mussolini had presented themselves as thick as thieves and inseparable. Now Hitler was starting to regret their closeness.

Both Goebbels and Hitler worried that Italy’s failures were upstaging Germany’s successes. Their concern was that the Germans were putting on a good show but the Italians were stealing their thunder with absurd antics in a backwards propaganda phenomenon not unlike modern “photobombing.”

Venting in his diary after Italy’s failures in December 1940, Goebbels accused Italy of “unequaled amateurishness.” “The Italians have ruined the entire military prestige of the Axis’, he seethed. ‘The Italians were once Romans. But now we have to intervene. Not in order to help them, but just to drive the English away … Rome is incorrigible.'” …

The intrepid Erwin Rommel was intended to act as a bulwark of German support shipped fresh to Libya by Hitler to assuage a fretting Mussolini, almost as a type of human goodwill token – not to mention that sending a German to control the situation suited Hitler’s ulterior motives of preventing further Italian debacles from drawing the world’s eye.