Book Excerpt: The Battle of Alamein Analysis

 

My conclusions about the famous battle known as “the end of the beginning” of World War II, drawn from my most recent book, Montgomery vs. Rommel at El Agheila 1942: Duel at the Gates of Egypt, now available from Pen & Sword Military.

Much has been said about the battle in later years, mostly to cast Montgomery in a negative light. He is criticized because the battle was fiercer and took longer than expected, or because it was bloody, or he had access to intelligence reports about Rommel’s supply situation – things all quite common in warfare. No battle ever goes exactly as expected, and if commanders made no use of intelligence reports and fought their battles blindfolded to demonstrate their skills, then they would be gamblers rather than military leaders.

It has also been rumoured that Monty’s plan was not original but the creation of Sir Harold Alexander, then serving as Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East. These rumours have existed since the war and are untrue. Alexander was not an overbearing personality. He was brought in to keep a bird’s eye view on the Middle East and otherwise left Montgomery to fight his own battles…

The myth speculating about Monty’s plan originates from the same wellspring of critics who have followed the same discordant refrain. They have been unable to decide whether they think it was Auchinleck, Alexander or De Guingand who planned the Battle of El Alamein, but there is one thing they can agree on, which is to not give any credit to Montgomery for his own decisive victory. These same critics variously accuse Montgomery of being unmanageable at the same time they insist he was meek, and assert he devised plans with strategic shortcomings when at the same time they claim these very plans were someone else’s idea entirely; the illogicality of these various assertions shows them to be false…

What truly shaped the Battle of Alamein, more than most historians have admitted, are the unique skills that both Rommel and Montgomery possessed as commanders. The fact that the battle became so bloody and drawn out – that it was not a walkover for Monty – was due to Rommel’s resolve, his ingenuity, the hardiness of his troops and his gritty determination to stem the tide of the British advance through every means at his disposal….The reason why the Eighth Army won the battle was Montgomery’s leadership and talents as a field commander – not, as some including Rommel would claim, merely coincidences, such as the facts that he possessed numerical superiority, intelligence and greater access to supplies.

It need not be pointed out that British commanders prior to Monty possessed access to cryptological intelligence resources as well as greater supplies and failed to defeat Rommel. Furthermore, Rommel previously defeated enemies with greater troop strength during both World Wars – using deception, speedy manoeuvres, unpredictability and willingness to deviate from higher orders in the face of opportunity…. Montgomery was far from careless of the lives of his men. The criticisms Montgomery has faced for excelling and winning this battle are undeserved.